The relationship between rent sharing and wages has been generally evaluated at the average wages. This paper uses a unique employer-employee panel database to investigate the extent of rent sharing along the wage distribution in Italy. We apply quantile regression techniques and control for national level bargaining, unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. Our findings show that the extent of rent-sharing decreases along the wage distribution, suggesting that unskilled workers benefit the most from firms' rents, and this might be related to the role of unions.
Introduction
In competitive labour market models there is not a relation between profits and wages at the firm level, since firms are wage-takers and face a horizontal labour supply.
However, non-competitive theories such as efficiency wages models and bargaining theories, predict that there might be a positive relationship between wages and profits.
In particular, rent sharing models underline that wages result from a bargain between the employer and the employees which generates a long-run positive relation between wages and profits. In this setting, wages are determined by workers' outside options, by quasi-rent (firm profits evaluated at the opportunity cost of labour) and by relative bargaining power of the parties involved (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997) .
At the empirical level many papers have tested the existence and extent of rent sharing (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993 , Van Reenen, 1996 , Margolis and Salvanes, 2001 , Martins, 2009 , Card et al., 2011 . However, these analyses have been generally carried out taking into account average wages. In such a way it is not possible to have an insight of the distributional consequences of rent sharing, i.e. it is not possible to take into account the difference in the degree of rent sharing for workers located at different points of the wage distribution.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the degree of rent sharing along the overall wage distribution in order to get a better understanding of the relationship between profits and wages. There might be different reasons for which rent sharing is not uniform along the workers' wage distribution. On the one hand, it might be argued that if bargaining at the firm level is mainly organized by unions, low and median skilled workers might enjoy a higher degree of rent sharing than high skilled workers.
On the other hand, if bargaining occurs mainly at the individual level, rent sharing might favour high skilled workers who benefit from performance pay schemes (Lemieux et al., 2009) . Hence, given the ambiguous theoretical predictions the analysis of rent sharing along the wage distribution is mostly an empirical issue, and to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that addresses this issue.
In our analysis we make use of a unique employer-employee panel database from 1996 to 2003 for Italy, constructed by merging the INPS (the Italian Social Security Institute) employer-employee panel database with the AIDA (provided by Bureau Van Dick) database that contains detailed information on the balance sheets of the Italian capital-owned firms. We carry out an empirical analysis taking into account all the issues which has been proved to be relevant when addressing the relationship between rents and wages.
We begin by estimating the impact of quasi-rents on wages using cross sectional quantile regressions, controlling for workers' and firms observed heterogeneity. In the estimation we use as proxy for the alternative wage the minimum wage that allows us to exactly control for the kind of national contract applied to each worker and, within the contract, for the exact level ('livello di inquadramento') the worker belongs to. This is a more accurate measure for first level bargaining than the use of average industrial wages as generally done in the literature. Cross section estimates show that the impact of rent sharing is decreasing along the wage distribution. In fact the rent sharing elasticities go from 6.9 at the 10 th wage percentile to 4.7at the 90 th wage percentile.
We also control for the sorting of workers that can affect the relationship between profits and wages (Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2011 , Arai and Heyman, 2001 , Margolis and Salvanes, 2001 , Martins, 2009 . By applying quantile fixed effects estimates that explicitly takes into account the individual unobserved heterogeneity (Canay, 2011) , results significantly change. In particular, the impact of rent sharing is significantly reduced along all the wage distribution, with reduction slightly more pronounced for the upper tail. This means that skilled workers sort into high profitable firms and that not taking into account this issue could bring to misleading estimates of the relationship between profits and wages. As a consequence, taking sorting into account produces coefficients that are still decreasing along the wage distribution, but by a lesser extent.
Furthermore, and as shown by previous literature (Card et al., 2011 , van Reenen, 1996 , endogeneity is a serious concern when addressing the issue of rent sharing.
Also, the attenuation bias of the cross-sectional estimation could be even exacerbated by a fixed effects strategy (Nickell, 1981) . Therefore, we apply IV quantile fixed effect estimation techniques (Galvao, 2011, Galvao and Montes-Rojas, 2010) . As instrument we exploit the idea developed in Card, Devicienti and Maida (2011) by using a weighted average of the real sales per employee in other provinces of Italy, but in the same 3-digit industry, with weights equal to the inverse of the distance between provinces. The idea is that real sales per employee in the same narrowed defined industry -which represents industry demand shocks -, affect the profitability of the firms. On the other hand, these sales relate to firms in other provinces of Italy and therefore they are uncorrelated with local labour market conditions. Consistently with the related literature, by applying IV estimates elasticities increase along all the wage distribution and by a large amount, thus pointing out that there was a severe degree of underestimation in previous fixed effects techniques. In particular, the elasticity of wages with respect to rent is equal to 7.3% at the 10 th percentile, 4.8% at the median and 3.7% at the highest percentile, thus highlighting that the degree of rent sharing is decreasing along the wage distribution. Further, the "Lester" range of variation in wages between unprofitable and profitable firm runs from 21% at the 10 th percentile to 11% at the 90 th percentile consistently -to some extent-with the findings of Card et al. (2011) for the average wages.
As possible explanation for this decreasing pattern of rent sharing along the wage distribution, one might argue that in Italy the bargaining takes place mainly at the firm level, and not at the individual level, and hence unions may play a crucial role. In this framework, it would be not surprising that unions would bargain higher rent sharing for low and medium skilled workers with respect to the high skilled ones. This is consistent with the findings in Bagger et al. (2011) , where it is shown that worker's bargaining power decreases with its education level.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the theoretical as well as the empirical literature concerning the relationship between profits and wages.
In Section 3 we describe the data we use throughout the empirical analyses. Section 4 discusses the empirical specification and presents the main results. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
Standard competitive theories predict that there is no relationship between wages and profits at firm level, since wages are determined by labour market conditions and firms have no incentives to pay wages over the level set in the labour market. However, noncompetitive theories underline that such a relationship can actually exists, i.e. that firms may indeed pay a wage over the level set in the labour market because of different reasons. For instance, it is possible that firms pay higher wages than those set in the competitive labour market due to efficiency wage arguments (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, Krueger and Summers, 1988) . Also, according to bargaining theories, profits and wages can move together since employer and employee bargain on wages.
More specifically, in a bargaining framework, wages at firm level are determined by workers' outside options, by the quasi-rent (firm profits evaluated at the opportunity cost of labour) and by the relative bargaining power of the parties involved (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). 3 As for the empirical evidence, many works studied the existence and the extent of rent sharing in different countries, using various methodologies and data at different levels. Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) -by using respectively firm level (for UK) and industry level data matched with individual data (for US)-provide evidence in favour of an important positive relationships between profits and wages, controlling for observed work heterogeneity and firm characteristics and applying GMM techniques (or using lagged values of profits) to control for the endogeneity of profits.
Other papers used instrumental variables techniques to control for the endogeneity of profits, while using firm level data to take into account firm heterogeneity. For instance Abowd and Lemieux (1993) , for the case of Canada, use instruments related to the international performance, namely the industry import and export prices, finding a very large degree of underestimation in the extent of rent sharing when not controlling for the endogeneity between profits and wages. Van Reenen (1996) analyzes the case of UK using different measures for profits (net profits per head, quasi-rents and Tobin Q), and past innovations as instruments. His findings suggest substantial amount of rent sharing in UK, and a severe underestimation when not controlling for endogeneity.
More recently, various papers have made use of matched employer-employee panel data in order to control for the unobserved worker heterogeneity. Margolis and Salvanes (2001) investigate the case of France and Norway. They apply IV techniques using as instruments sales and operating subsidies, finding relevant rent sharing only in the case of Norway. For the case of France they show that when taking into account the unobserved individual characteristics in the IV estimation, rent sharing estimates turn out to be not significant. Similarly, using employer-employee data Arai (2003) analyzes the case of Sweden. He uses time-average of lagged values of profits and controls for observable firm characteristics to check the relevance of both the rent sharing and of other theories (based on efficiency wages and short-run labour market frictions). He finds out robust evidence of rent sharing in line with bargaining theories, 3 It is worth noting that also within a modified version of the competitive model it is possible that wages and profits are positively correlated. In particular, in presence of short-run frictions, such that firms face an upward sloping labour supply curve, positive demand shocks might bring to a raise in total firm profits and wages (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997) . However, in the long-run, wages adjust to the competitive level, unless there are mechanisms that prevent this adjustment. Hence, a test for rent sharing cannot rest on the evidence of a short-run correlation between profits and wages.
which does not differ across different workers' categories. 4 In another related paper Arai and Heyman (2001) make use of a larger employer-employee matched dataset and apply instrumental variable techniques. They use different instruments such as lagged values of profits, demand elasticity (based on predicted response in sales due to higher prices) and measures indicating the degree of competition in the product market. Their findings confirm that rent sharing is underestimated when not controlling for endogeneity and greater estimates are provided when demand elasticity is used as instrument. Further, they point out that white collar extract more rents than blue collar.
Another interesting related paper is Guertzgen (2009) , which focuses on how rent sharing is affected by the different levels of bargaining in Germany, using firm-worker level data and GMM techniques. He shows that rent sharing is higher where there is no union sector coverage and in presence of firm-specific contracts. Moreover, he looks at differences among workers' groups finding out that only for blue collars rent sharing actually disappears under centralized contracts. Also Rusinek and Rycx (2008) shed lights on more recent wage dynamics. Moreover, we look at the extent of rent sharing along the wage distribution, which have not been previously investigated.
Data Description
We contains individual information such as age, gender, occupation, workplace, date of beginning and end of the current contract (if any), the kind of national contract and the related minimum wage, the social security contributions, the worker status (part-time or full-time), the real gross yearly wage and the number of worked weeks and days.
We then have some information concerning the firm such as the plant location (province), the number of employees and the sector (Ateco91). We focus on male and female prime-age workers, aged between 25 and 49 (when they first enter in the database), working in the industrial and service sectors, both part-time (converted in 5 Other papers that address issues similar to rent-sharing for Italy are Pencavel, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2006) who investigate differences in wages between capital-owned and worker-owned firms and Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) who focus on risk sharing and analyze the response in wages to firms specific shocks in value added, distinguishing by temporary and permanent shocks. 6 ISFOL stands for "Institute for the Development of Vocational Training". The sample scheme has been set up to follow individuals born on the 10 th of March, June, September and December and therefore the proportion of this sample on the Italian employees' population is approximately of 1/90. 7 For the information on employers we also make use of the ASIA ("Italian Statistical Archive of Operating Firms") database, provided by ISTAT. This database has been used since 1999, because the INPS employer database was not available after 1998. The two databases provide the same set of information (firm size and sector).
full-time equivalent) and full-time, employed in standard labour market contracts: blue collar and white collar workers. 8 We merge the INPS dataset with detailed data on the balance sheets of the (capitalowned) firms where workers are employed, which come from the AIDA database from 1996 until 2003. AIDA is a database on Italian firms provided by Bureau Van Dijk that contains information on the balance sheet of the firms such as value added, profits, sales, production and costs of production. 9 As main independent variable we use quasi-rent per worker as in Van Reenen (1996) and Card et al. (2011) . 10 We also use real sales per employee in order to carry out IV estimates.
The two databases are merged by using as key variable the tax code or the VAT number (codice fiscale or partita IVA) of the company. The number of records matched with respect to the total number of records in the INPS database is around 47%.
However, it is worth noting that AIDA contains capital-owned firms with total value of production equal or higher than 950.000 euro while INPS data contain workers employed in all kinds of companies no matters the legal status and the amount of the total value of production. Therefore, the share of non-matched records is due to those workers who are employed in other kind of firms or in capital-owned firms with total value of production less than 950.000 euro. After the merge, the panel version has been constructed considering only one observation per year for each worker. For those workers who display more than one observation per year we selected the longest available contract in terms of weeks worked. We then eliminated those extreme observations below (above) the 1 st (99 th ) percentile of the wage and quasi rent distribution. We also dropped those observations for which the growth rate of wages from year to year was higher (less) than 100%(-50%) and where the growth rate of the quasi rent variable was higher (less) than 500%(-500% 
Econometric Analysis

Econometric Strategy
In this section we aim at analyzing the impact of rents on wages. Since our focus concerns the relationship between rents and wages along the wage distribution, we perform quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) . We use the INPS-AIDA employer-employee database from 1996-2003 and the baseline specification is the following:
where θ refers to the percentile, i to individuals, j(i,t) to the firm where the worker i is employed at time t, c(i,t) to the national contract (along with its level) the worker is subject to, s to industry. The dependent variable in our regressions is the (log)
real gross weekly wage. The term I_Chari,t is the set of observed individual characteristics (age, age squared, tenure and occupation dummy). MWc(i,t) is the national contract minimum wage that controls for first level bargaining.
QuasiRentsj(i,t) is quasi-rent per employee. Firmsizei,t is the proxy for firm
heterogeneity, while φs, λa, δt are industry, area (five macro-areas in Italy:
Northwest, Northeast, Centre, South and Islands) and time dummies respectively.
All the variables of interest are in logarithms and therefore we estimate elasticities.
In the first specification, as benchmark estimates, we perform cross-sectional quantile estimates where, as already stressed, we use as alternative wage the minimum wage which captures the extent of the first (national) level of bargaining. It is worth to remind that the minimum wage turns out to be a very accurate measure for controlling for first level bargaining compared to previous used measures such as average industrial wages, because it is related to the specific contract (and within the contract to the specific level) the worker belongs to.
Since an important concern in our analysis is also to tackle the issue of the unobserved individual heterogeneity that can bias the cross sectional estimates, we then carry out quantile fixed effects estimates (Canay, 2011) . In fact the sorting of workers has been proved in the literature to be very important in affecting the relationship between rents and wages since high skilled workers might sort into high
1, 
profitable firms (Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2011 , Martins, 2009 , Arai and Heyman, 2001 , Margolis and Salvanes, 2001 ).
Finally, in order to control also for the issue of the endogeneity between profits and wages (due to simultaneous determination and to possible measurements errors in variables) we also apply an IV strategy. It is in fact worth to remind that in the case of endogeneity the (attenuation) bias in the cross-sectional estimates can be severe and also aggravated by a fixed effects strategy (Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2011) . This also has been proved to be a very important concern in the literature and results have generally confirmed a severe underestimation of the impact of rents on wages when no taking into account endogeneity (Van Reenen, 1996) . Therefore we use a very recently developed estimation strategy of IV quantile fixed effects estimates (Galvao, 2011, and Galvao and Montes-Rojas, 2010) , which is an extension of the IV quantile procedure of Chernozukov and Hansen (2008) that allows for the inclusion of fixed effects as introduced in Koenker (2004) . 14 As instrument we exploit the idea developed in Card,
Devicienti and Maida (2011) by using a weighted average of the firm sales per employee in other provinces of Italy but in the same three-digit industry of the considered firm. The weights are the inverse of the distance between provinces. The idea is that industry sales, which represent industry demand shocks, affect the profitability of the firms while, at the same time, they are not correlated with local labour market conditions since they concern firms in other provinces of Italy. Table 2 shows the cross-sectional quantile estimates of the impact of profits per employee on workers' wages, by using the minimum wage as a proxy for the first level of bargaining. This measure allows us to carefully control for the first level of bargaining and it represents a better measure for the alternative wage than the use of average industrial wages, since wages are defined within contracts rather than within industries.
Results
The results of these estimates turn out to be very interesting. In fact it can be seen that, first of all, the impact of minimum wage is positive and increasing along all the wage distribution and its elasticity is higher than 1, meaning that an increase in the minimum wage implies a more than proportional increase in the corresponding
14
For a detailed description of the procedures applied see the appendix in Matano and Naticchioni (2012) and Canay (2011 ), Galvao (2011 and Galvao and Montes-Rojas (2010). worker's wage, which is also higher the higher is the occupational category considered.
As for rent sharing, the impact turns out to be not uniform along the wage distribution.
In particular, elasticity estimates turn out to be equal to 6.9% at the 10 th percentile, 5.7% at the median and 4.7% at the 90 th percentile. Moreover, since these estimated take into account the importance of the first (national) level of bargaining, these results highlight that rent sharing is a phenomenon that essentially take place within firms (according to van Reenen, 1996) . Further, the "Lester" range of variation in wages between unprofitable and profitable firm runs from 20% at the 10 th percentile to 14% at the 90 th percentile consistently -to some extent-with the findings of Card et al. (2011) for the average wages. 15 16 However, these estimates are likely to be biased because they do not take into account the sorting of workers, i.e. the fact that high skilled workers might sort into high profitable firms. Therefore we run quantile fixed effects estimates (Canay, 2011) , which allows us to introduce fixed effects in the estimation that capture time invariant workers' characteristics such as ability and education. Table 3 shows the results. As we can see, estimates significantly change when we take into account the individual unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, coefficients are highly reduced in magnitude, even if they are still slightly decreasing along the wage distribution. Moreover, there is a slightly higher degree of reduction for the upper tail of the wage distribution where coefficients estimates are now reduced by 61% (compared with a 59% decrease in the lowest tail of the wage distribution). 15 As for the control variable in the estimation, the age shows a concave pattern, which is increasing along the wage distribution; the gender wage gap is higher at the highest percentiles; the return to tenure is positive and decreasing along the wage distribution and the occupation dummy is positive and increasing, highlighting higher wages for higher occupation categories. The firm size has a just slightly decreasing impact along the wage distribution.
16
The "Lester" range is defined as the elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rent multiplied by four times the ratio between the standard deviation of quasi-rent and mean quasi-rent. It gives us a measure of how much the wage of a worker increases moving from a firm at the bottom of the profit distribution (two standard deviation below the mean) to a firm at the top of the profit distribution (two standard deviations above the mean). Lester (1952) . In our case our measures for the Lester range represent a proxy that can give an idea of the magnitude of the impact of rent sharing on wages, since we are taking into account quantiles rather than average wages. Notes: ***,** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely.
Const
-3.128*** -3.445*** -4.000*** -4.363*** -4.354*** These results are consistent with previous empirical evidence that shows that taking into account the sorting of workers entails a high reduction in the estimated degree of rent sharing (see for instance Card et al., 2011 , Martins 2009 Ln Quasi Rent 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019***
Ln Minimum Wage
To characterize further the evidence on the sorting of workers into high profitable firms we also present a descriptive statistic of the percentage of workers, classified by their belonging to each of the quartiles of the wage distribution, who are sort into firms distinguished by their profits (quartile) level (Table 4) . In other words we divide observations in cells according to the quartiles of the firm profits distribution and then we look at the percentage of workers within each cell who belong to a specific quartile of the wage distribution. Table 4 clearly shows and confirms our findings related to the sorting of workers into high profitable firms. In fact, if we look at the 4 th row, where there are the highest profitable firms (those into the 4 th quartile of the profit distribution), the percentage of workers who belong to the first quartile of the wage distribution (lowest paid workers) is 11%, while the same percentage in the least profit firms (1 st quartile, 1 st row) is equal to 47.17%, more than four times the previous value.
On the other hand, looking at the highest paid workers (column (4)), these are relatively more concentrated into the highest profit firms (41.21%), while their presence into the lowest profit firms is relatively low (11.19%). Moreover these percentages show a monotonic pattern. As for the workers in the middle quartiles (2 nd and 3 rd ) differences are not so striking, but still present: those in the second quartile are relatively more concentrated into the lowest profits firms (26%, 30% with respect to 25% and 19% into the highest profits firm), while those in the third quartile are relatively more concentrated into the highest profit firms (30% and 29% against 16%
and 25% for low profit firms). Thus this picture clearly underline and confirm our findings in terms of the sorting of workers into high profitable firms in Italy.
Profit Distribution (quartiles) Finally, we present the IV estimates since, as already pointed out, the endogeneity between rents and wages can cause a severe degree of underestimation of the degree of rent sharing which can be also worsened by a fixed effects strategy (Card et al., 2011) . As we can see, when taking into account the endogeneity of the relationship between profits and wages, results significantly change. In fact the elasticities of rents with respect to wages are now much higher and the highest increases concern the lower tail of the wage distribution. In particular, rents have a decreasing impact along the wage distribution with elasticities running from 7.3% at the 10th percentile, to 4.8% at the median and falling to a 3.7% at the highest percentile. In terms of the Lester range this is equal to 0.21 at the bottom percentile, 0.14 at the median and 0.11 at the highest percentile, which means that a workers who passes from an unprofitable firms (two standard deviations below the mean of profits) to a profitable one (two standard deviations above the mean of profits), gets an increase in wage of 21% at the bottom of the wage distribution, 14% at the median and 11% at the top. These estimates are quite consistent (just slightly higher) with those of Card, Devicienti and Maida (2011) 
Characterization of the results
In this section we carry out some descriptive statistics that helps us to further characterize our results. In particular we analyze firm performance by quartiles of the firm profits distribution. We have a look at the average growth rate of profits in order to see whether in Italy it is high profits or low profits firms that on average have enjoyed the highest growth rates in profits. This picture is interesting because if we find out that low profits firms (where the majority of low skilled workers are sorted into) are those who have also enjoyed the highest profits growth rates, it means that not only low paid workers are those with higher elasticities with respect to rents, but also that -in cumulative terms-the overall amount of rent shared goes to this kind of workers. On the other hand, if high profits firms are those that have enjoyed the highest growth rate of profits it means that, even if low paid workers are those who gain more from rent sharing, since they are relatively less present in these kinds of firms, the overall cumulative rents they can extract from firms is limited (since they are concentrated in firms with low profits growth rates).
We therefore proceed by computing the annual growth of profits using the dataset collapsed by firm in order not to count twice or more firms that have more than a worker present in our database and then to average out these values for each the firms.
Since for some firms we do not have any information about its annual growth rate, we lose a certain number of observations in these descriptive statistics (4,452) which however represents 3.6% of our sample. 17 Nonetheless, the picture gives interesting results that are worthy to be reported. In fact, table 6 shows that that the firms who have experienced between 1996-2003 a higher degree of average annual profits growth rates in percentage terms are highest profits firms (7.6%) followed by the lowest profits firms (6.92%), while the growth rate for the firms characterized by a medium level of profits has been around 6%. In terms of the median the picture is slightly different since profits increase monotically through the distribution of firms profits. This could be explained by the fact the there are some very low profits firm that have enjoyed a high rate of profits growth. So these descriptive statistics, joint with previous results, point out a picture where low skilled workers, who are relatively more concentrated in low profits firms and that experience a relatively higher elasticity of wages with respect to rents, are partially employed in firms that in Italy have experienced a high growth rate of profits. On the other hand, high skilled workers, sorted into high profits firms, even if characterized by a low degree of rent sharing, enjoyed a cumulative premium relatively high due to the profits growth rates of these firms. Average Annual Growth Rate of Profits 
Conclusions
In this work we analyze the degree of rent sharing along the wage distribution. Our findings show that rent sharing impact is not uniform across workers located at different points of the wage distribution. In particular, taking into account first national level of bargaining, sorting and endogeneity, we find out a decreasing pattern of rent sharing along the wage distribution, with elasticities of wages with respect to quasi rents passing from 7.3% at the 10 th percentile to 3.7% at the 90 th percentile of the workers' wage distribution. One of the possible explanation might be related to the role for firm unions in protecting the lowest paid workers' categories. Moreover, to further characterize our findings, we look at the average growth rate of profits of the firms distinguished by profits levels, in order to check whether the relatively higher return to rent-sharing for low skilled workers is offset by the fact that they work in the 0.5th (99.5th) for the sales per employee variable; individuals characterized by observations for which the growth rate of the wage from year to year was higher than 100% or less than -50% and where the growth rate of the quasi rent variable was higher than 500% or less than -500%, and finally individuals for which information on the minimum wage was not available).
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